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SENATOR RICK SANTORUM*
1. INRODUCTION
America's first generation of environmental statutes is now a
quarter of a century old. Since 1970, legislation at the federal
level has been responsible for significant progress in the quality of
our air, land, and water. Paradoxically, our experience with
environmental policy includes these achievements, as well as a
legacy of questions about the costs and effectiveness of these
policies. While such policies may have served us well as a
prosperous country just beginning - and well equipped - to
grapple with the pursuit of environmental values in the public
arena, this special issue of the University of Pennsylvania Journal
of International Economic Law arrives at an appropriate moment
as we seek to reevaluate how we can best pursue and realize such
values at the "second generation" stage of environmental policy.
As we move toward this next stage, policy makers have seemingly
been left with a irreconcilable choice between two competing
environmental policy visions.
One vision places environmental values above all others and
continues to pursue such values in a "command and control" way.
This model requires the promulgation of regulations at the federal
level, which, in turn, translates into uniform compliance at every
level of society. The other vision, pursued by "free-market
environmentalists" believes that decentralized tools such as user
fees, incentives, and markets can solve environmental problems
better than centralized tools such as subsidies, bureaucracy, and
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regulation.
The command and control, environmental compliance model
assumes that individual choices are generally opposed to environ-
mental stewardship goals and that, therefore, those decisions
should be made at the highest level and imposed uniformly on the
largest possible population. This vision emphasizes the necessity
of a national - even international - outlook.
The second model - the "free market" - contends that the
problem lies in the general assumption among environmental
policy makers that environmental problems require governmental
control, and that environmental problems result from a failure to
integrate environmental resources into the market. Personal
freedom and respect for property rights are principal tenets of this
vision. By encouraging a more efficient use of resources, responsi-
ble stewardship, and technological innovation, the free market
would provide the basis for a superior approach to environmental
policy.
Clearly, these two views have tended to polarize the debate as
we move to the next generation of environmental policy. This
has led us to a situation where every example of environmental
neglect exposed by proponents of the first model is countered by
examples of bureaucratic intrusiveness, economic cost, or excessive
regulation by proponents of the second vision.
2. FEDERAL WETLAND POLICY
Federal wetlands policy is an example of how the model of top
down, command and control compliance with federal regulation
can fail to serve the goals of environmental protection, the
imperative of personal freedom, and the principle of property
ownership.
Many concerned environmentalists will note the dramatic loss
of America's wetlands. Yet over the last decade the convergence
of two little known wetland trends has resulted in the achieve-
ment of the stated national goal of "no net loss" of wetlands.
Indeed, some recent studies indicate that the goal has not only
been met but exceeded. Wetland loss due to agricultural conver-
sion, formerly the number one source of wetland loss, has slowed
to a trickle. Also during the last decade, wetland restoration has
exploded. What was once a few thousand experimental acres
nationwide has become hundreds of thousands of acres a year.
As part of the most recent National Resources Inventory
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("NRI"), the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Natural Resource
and Conservation Service surveyed wetlands across the country to
document their status and trends. According to the NRI, the
annual gross loss of wetlands between the 1982 and 1992 period
was 156,000 acres a year. Average annual agricultural losses were
31,000 acres per year, urban losses were 89,000 acres per year, and
other losses were 37,000 acres per year. The authors of the NRI
wetlands survey point out that by the end of the period, agricul-
tural losses had likely slowed even further to an estimated 15,000
acres per year. If these trends hold steady, it is probable that the
United States lost roughly 141,000 acres of wetlands in 1995.
Beginning in the mid-1980s the federal government began
several non-regulatory programs designed to restore wetlands.
Wetland restoration is defined as the reestablishment of wetland
hydrology and wetland vegetation to lands which had previously
been drained, typically for agricultural purposes. Wetland
restoration is distinct from both creation - building a wetland
where none has ever existed - and enhancement - improving the
functioning of an existing wetland. The first programs to begin
wide scale restoration were the North American Waterfowl
Management Plan and the Partners For Wildlife Program, both
operated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. In the early
1990s, the Department of Agriculture began restoring wetlands
under the wetland reserve program. In 1995:
* the Partners For Wildlife Program restored 48,000
acres;
* the North American Waterfowl Management Plan
restored 42,000 acres; and
0 the Wetland Reserve Program enrolled 118,000 acres.
In some cases, not all enrolled or reported acres are returned
to wetland status. For example, approximately ten percent of the
acres enrolled in the Wetland Reserve Program remain as buffer
uplands. Despite this small percentage of enrolled uplands, these
three wetland programs restored at least 187,000 acres of wetlands
- well in excess of the 141,000 acres of wetland converted to
other uses every year.
Given the current success of wetland restoration programs and
the decline of wetland losses, there is little doubt the nation as a
whole has exceeded its expectation of no-net-loss. In addition,
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wetland restoration programs appear to be a cost effective
approach to achieving national wetland policy goals.
Current wetlands policy fails to take into account the reasons
for the decrease in wetlands loss. As technology has advanced,
farmers have been able to re-farm existing farmland, thus the need
to convert wetlands into farmlands has decreased. Further, as
demand for new farmlands decreased so did their cost. Wetlands
conversion became expensive by comparison and, thus, less
desirable. The assumptions upon which our wetlands policy was
formulated were flawed in three ways.
First, environmental policy makers assumed individual choices
would not benefit resource conservation - but they did.
Individuals made choices about what they could afford and what
was cost-effective and many farm owners decided wetlands
conversion was too expensive.
Second, the assumptions ignored the role market factors could
play in wetlands protection. In other words, wetlands protection
did not need to be the overriding goal in order to be realized.
Third, the policy is regulated in a top-down, centrally
controlled manner, which makes it extremely inefficient. The
body charged with oversight, the Army Corps of Engineers, does
not have, nor is ever likely to have, the resources to police the
entire country. The 1,150 full-time equivalent employees in the
Corps of Engineers regulatory division only have the resources to
identify approximately 15% of wetlands losses. When compared
with voluntary programs such as the Wetlands Reserve Program
or the North American Waterfowl Management Plan, the Corps
of Engineers 404 mitigation program is five times more expensive
per acre of wetland protected and end up protecting fewer
wetlands than the other voluntary programs.
3. CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The competing visions of environmental progress have
occasionally led to conflict between the federal government on
one hand and state or local governments on the other. In
concept, many of our environmental statutes are intended to be
implemented and enforced by state and local governments. The
Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and Superfund all provide
a significant role for smaller units of government. Too often,
however, state and local governments often find their power
usurped by Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") rule-
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making.
Each of the federal government's principal environmental
statutes is accompanied by volumes of detailed rulemakings and
guidance giving direction from EPA to states and communities on
how the law is to be implemented. Rather than promoting
flexibility and innovation on the local level, these mandates
frequently limit states and local governments to a single course of
action.
A case in point is the controversy surrounding the EPA's
centralized emissions testing requirements for automobile
inspection and maintenance programs. The underlying goal of the
policy is reduce a highly localized problem, automobile emissions,
and it would seem uniquely suited to innovative local approaches.
The EPA, however, imposed a one-size-fits-all, top-down regulato-
ry approach which severely restricts local innovation.
The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act requires states to
establish a centralized test and repair program unless states could
demonstrate that a decentralized program could be equally
effective. As promulgated by the EPA, the rules ensured that
states would never have a chance to show that a decentralized
program could work as well. Under EPA rules, states attempting
to use a decentralized program would be arbitrarily limited to half
of the emissions reductions credits of a centralized program. Since
this requirement would mean that states would have to achieve
costly and difficult emissions reductions in other areas to compen-
sate, the EPA's rulemaking virtually guaranteed that states would
use only the EPA approved emissions testing program. Only after
a few renegade states bucked the EPA's mandate did most state air
regulators begin to contemplate instituting a decentralized
program; nevertheless, it took legislative action by Congress to
remove the fifty percent limitation on credits to finally open the
door to state flexibility and innovation.
In this case, the goals of both the federal government and the
states was identical: to reduce the general contribution to air
pollution by vehicles. And yet the attempt to reach this goal
became exceedingly costly - both in terms of dollars and in terms
of lost trust between the proponents of the competing visions.
4. FREE MARKET SOLUTIONS
Americans want a safer, cleaner, healthier environment. They
want the magnificent beauty of our land preserved for future
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generations. But they also want a strong, growing economy.
Reconciling the latter goal with the former is where the conflict
between the two models most often originates.
No one will dispute that free markets remain our best
mechanism for economic growth. Free market environmentalism
contends that environmental policy can take into account, and
itself be integrated into, free market policies for several reasons.
First, a prosperous nation is more likely to have the time and the
resources to protect the environment. Second, the principles of
free-market economics can impose a much-needed discipline on
environmental policies using cost/benefit analysis and considering
the needs and choices of individuals and communities. The
marketplace is where citizens can most clearly and honestly
express their preferences, needs and goals. Third, an environmen-
tal policy which assumes free-market mechanisms is one which is
implicitly dynamic rather than static. It has the capability of
responding to societal changes as expressed in the marketplace,
unlike a policy formulated in isolation from the marketplace.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a more efficient environ-
mental policy can not only respond to the demands of the
marketplace, it can enter into it.
For example, the emissions trading program for sulfur dioxide
that was added to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments has
proven to be much more successful than even its strongest
proponents could have hoped. Although many environmentalists
fought against its inclusion because of fears that sale of the
emissions credits would amount to a "right to pollute," the
program has led to a fifty percent reduction in annual sulfur
dioxide emissions at roughly a third of the cost of the earlier, rigid
regulatory approach. The results clearly demonstrate that linking
environmental objectives with economic incentives can spur
innovation and unleash dynamic forces to achieve environmental
policy goals more efficiently than command and control-style
regulations.
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAWMAKERS
In writing environmental legislation, Congress has too often
side-stepped policy confrontations by passing responsibility for
crafting specific regulations onto the agencies. This approach has
enabled legislators to pass popular bills, but it also cedes broad
authority to regulators. In effect, our most sweeping environ-
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mental laws are now being written by unelected bureaucrats in
federal departments and agencies. Perhaps the single most
controversial environmental issue of 1997 will be the proposed
revision of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the
Clean Air Act. This revision does not involve a change in the
law. Rather, the EPA has proposed toughening the air quality
standards as part of its periodic administrative review. These
proposed standards will impose daunting new requirements and
costs on businesses and communities around the country - and
all without a single vote of Congress.
There is a basic Constitutional question at issue here: Should
agencies have the power to make wholesale revision to laws
without Congressional involvement? In an effort to reassert our
Constitutional authority to write laws, legislation was passed in
1996 to provide for Congressional review of significant regula-
tions. Most troubling about the current situation, however, is
that the fundamental presumption of lawmaking has been
inverted. Agencies are writing significant revisions to laws which
Congress may only consider blocking or accepting. In the
polarized politically-charged atmosphere of Washington, this
inevitably becomes a choice "for" or "against" the environment -
an inflexible situation which tends to thwart compromise.
6. CONCLUSION
The environmental problems which face both our nation and
the world will likely not continue to be solved by a static
command and control regulatory policy, whether that policy is
implemented nationally or internationally. What our remaining
environmental problems require is a dynamic solution in which
the federal government plays a leadership role in establishing
"next generation" environmental policy. But in formulating this
policy, we must be careful to incorporate the same fundamental
principles that shaped our democracy. Instead of a choice
between the two dominant models of environmental policy, I
believe that a shared vision is the most likely - and most
appropriate - road to take.
Present environmental polices often promote an adversarial
framework. The current centralized, top-down, one-size-fits-all
approach is often restrictive, inefficient, and ineffective. The
federal government should not abdicate its responsibility to lead
environmental policy; rather, it should lead with an approach that
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would promote greater flexibility, improved efficiency, and
increased effectiveness.
America's bountiful natural resources are as much a part of
our legacy as are our proud philosophical and institutional
traditions. It is my belief that protection of our nation's environ-
ment can be directly linked to such a heritage. Our environmen-
tal policies should be formulated within the same philosophical
context as our democracy was conceived. A variety of public
policy goals have been successfully pursued through those same
principles and values that have shaped our country. It is only
logical that they should define the policies that protect those
resources which contribute so greatly to our nation's very identity
and prosperity. Once we agree to accept a shared vision of
appropriate federal leadership and respect for American principles
we will begin to solve environmental problems differently, and I
would argue, more usefully and more cost effectively.
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